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Abstract
Boards of large corporations sharing some of their directors are connected in
complex networks. Boards are responsible for corporations’ long-term strategy
and are often involved in decisions about a common topic related to the belief
in economical growth or recession.
We are interested in understanding under which conditions a large majority
of boards making a same decision can emerge in the network. We present a
model where board directors are engaged in a decision making dynamics based
on ”herd behavior”. Boards influence each other through shared directors.
We find that imitation of colleagues and opinion bias due to the interlock do
not trigger an avalanche of identical decisions over the board network, whereas
the information about interlocked boards’ decisions does. There is no need to
invoke global public information, nor external driving forces.
This model provides a simple endogenous mechanism to explain the fact
that boards of the largest corporations of a country can, in the span of a few
months, take the same decisions about general topics.
PACS: 89.75 -k; 89.65 -s
Keywords: social networks, opinion dynamics, directorate interlock, Ising
model.
1 Introduction
We present a model for the diffusion of decisions in a network of corporate
boards linked by shared board directors. Boards of large corporations share
common directors with each other forming complex networks, often character-
ized by Small World properties [3].
An example of board network is shown in figure 1: nodes represent boards
of directors, two boards are connected by an edge if there is at least one director
sitting on both boards at the same time. The network represents the boards
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at 1 degree of separation (in term of edges) away from the board of Chase
Manhattan Bank. For instance the boards of Abbott Laboratories and Chase
Manhattan Bank are connected because they share one director.
We are interested in the influence of such networks on the decisions made by
boards. The role of boards is to make decisions about the long-term strategy of
the corporations. There are essentially two kinds of decisions a board is faced
to:
• Decisions regarding topics specific to the board, such as the appointment
of a vice president, for which we can assume that different boards don’t
influence each other. We previously studied [1] the role of subsets of well
connected directors on decisions of this type.
• By contrast, there are decisions about topics of general interest to the
economy such as whether to increase or decrease investments in devel-
opment or in advertisement, which depend on the belief in economical
growth or recession. Decisions of equivalent generality concern the adop-
tion of governance practices. In these cases, decisions previously made in
some boards might influence other boards, through the presence of shared
directors. The present paper is devoted to the dynamics of this kind of
decisions across the board network.
The second issue has already been studied in sociology. Haunschild in an
article [9] about the impact of interlock on US corporate acquisition activity
in the 80’, demonstrates the role of inter-organizational imitation of managers.
The article by Davis and Greve [4] concerns the diffusion of corporate gover-
nance practices such as the ”poison pill” among the US largest corporations in
the 80’ (The poison pill is a counter measure against hostile takover allowing
“target shareholders to acquire shares at a 50 perc. discount if an acquirer
passes a certain ownership threshold”).
Davis and Greve analyse a large set of empirical data and show that the
poison pill was primarily mediated by director interlock, with a spreading time
scale of the order of one year. In order to explain the observed spreading dy-
namics, the authors develop a contagion model in which boards are agents with
a certain probability to imitate an earlier adopter of the practice. The influence
of a board on an interlocked board is reduced or enhanced by a number of fac-
tors, discussed in detail by the authors, such as similar industrial sector, firm
size, firm performance, concentration of ownership of both companies involved.
We here present a model where agents are instead board directors engaged in
a decision making dynamics. Inter-boards influence takes place through shared
directors. We are not taking into account the heterogeneity of inter-boards
influences. We are interested in understanding under which conditions a large
majority of boards making a same decision can emerge. The decision making
process is based on the hypothesis that agents tend to follow the majority of
the agents to whom they are connected.
This kind of behavior is not perfectly rational in the sense of economics and
is known as ”herd behavior” [10] [6], but presents formal analogies with the
Ising model often used for social system models, [7] [8] [11].
Models [7] [8] [11] are based on binary opinion dynamics. The basic updating
process is the same as described here by equations 1 and 2, but interaction
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topologies are simplified to either full connectivity or lattice connectivity.
Unlike the cited works, in the present model the dynamics takes place on
an empirical etherogeneous network organized in interconnected groups. This
is the director network of Fortune 1000 corporations (data are kindly provided
by Davis [3]). The connectivity within a group (a board of directors) and
between groups is highly etherogeneous. Moreover, the dynamics takes places
in different groups at different times.
Furthermore, we explore two different scenarios for the influence exerted
by groups upon each other. In the first scenario the information about other
groups’ decisions only affects the initial opinions of interlocking directors. In the
second scenario such information is taken into account by all directors during
the whole board meeting.
Our main result in this paper is that the way this information is taken into
account by directors at a local level, determines whether, at a global level, it
can emerge a large majority of boards making the same decision.
1.1 Building a model for the spread of decisions
We here focus on a time scale of a few months, just the time for boards to
hold a couple of meetings. Typically we have in mind fast decisions concerning
investment and advertisement strategies for the next six months. Decisions
of this type are relevant for the macro-economics of a country, especially if
corporations tend to make similar decisions in connection to external dramatic
events such as crises or wars. It is therefore important to understand what
structural parameters of the network determine the number of boards adopting
a given decision. Of course this is a formidable task to accomplish, so we start
considering in this paper a simple situation in which decisions are binary and
the most central board of the network takes a decision in the first place and the
other boards meet afterwards. Because of the interlock, the decision made in
a given board is influenced by the presence of some directors that were present
at a previous meeting on another board.
Let us assume that each board has to make a binary decision. The opinion
of director i is represented by a binary variable si = ±1. For the decision
making dynamics in each board meeting, we assume a survey-like mechanism,
as in [1]: each director updates his opinion based on the average opinion of the
other directors, according to a logit probability function (see below).
Boards have meetings once per month, according to a given schedule. Direc-
tors start from an initial opinion si = ±1 at the beginning of the meeting. By
the end of a meeting, directors adopt the opinion that agrees with the decision
made by the board.
Therefore, directors serving on several boards start a new meeting with an
initial opinion adopted at the last meeting in another board. In this way the
decision made previously in a board can influence the decision making dynamics
in another board.
After first studying the decision spread on some simple test-bed networks
we concentrated on the real network of the boards 1 and 2 degrees of separation
away from the board of Chase Manhattan Bank in 1999.
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The most central board of the network meets first and the other boards
meet afterwards, according to a given schedule.
The topological structure of the network is known from the names of the
directors in the boards of the set of companies under consideration. On the
other hand, we do not know the magnitude of the influence of a board on
another one.
We here assume that the influence of one board on a connected board varies
in accordance with the number of directors shared by the two boards (the
interlock). For sake of simplicity we don’t take into account those specific
factors such as: some boards are very influential over other ones because of
differences in prestige, revenue, economic performance, expertise in a specific
field, see [4] for a detailed analysis.
We here present a first model in which the influence of a board b1 on another
board b2 is due only to the fact that those directors of b1 which sit also in b2,
will support, at the beginning of the meeting in b2, the choice adopted by b1.
We study how the pattern of decisions depends on the value of the average
interlock.
In the second model the influence of the interlock is increased by two factors.
• Inside the board, directors sitting also on common outside boards have a
larger mutual influence than other directors.
• Decisions made by other connected boards can be taken into account as
external signals by all board members.
2 Model 1
2.1 Inside board dynamics
We here describe the simplest model. Directors meet, discuss and vote.
In any new meeting directors’ opinions are initialized as follows:
• Directors participating at a meeting for the first time are initialized with
opinions randomly chosen among 0 or 1;
• all other directors start with the opinion they acquired at the previous
meeting they participated at,
• except for directors from the most central node bc which start at any new
meeting with the opinion that won in bc.
At each time step, a director randomly selected is informed of the opinions
of all other directors in the board at time t, and average them to evaluate a
field hi:
hi =
1
n
n∑
j=1
sj (1)
n being the size of the board. He updates his opinion according to a probabilistic
choice function of the field. The probability that director i takes some opinion
±1 at time t+ 1 is given by:
P{si(t+ 1) = ±1} =
exp(±βhi(t))
exp(βhi(t)) + exp(−βhi(t))
(2)
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The updated opinion is expressed by the director and is taken into account by
later sampled directors.
The average opinion m of the board, is a function of time during each
meeting and eventually converges at a value m∗ = ±1 for β ≫ 1. In all
simulations we set β = 4 such that the board converges to unanimity in less
than 30 steps, i.e. in roughly three average sampling of each director. We take
the final value of m∗ as the decision of the board. We will write m for m∗ in
the following for sake of simplicity.
2.2 Boards’ network dynamics
The central node meets first and the decision made is by convention +1.
Boards are assumed to meet monthly and to discuss again the same topic.
Each step represents a month, and hence a cycle of board meetings. The central
board meet first, followed by the nodes on each surrounding layer, in order of
distance from the center. Unless specified, the meeting schedule described here
will be assumed in the following for model 1 and for model 2.
Within the model described so far, the whole network converges to a stable
value of the average decision M∗ in 2-3 steps, which is reasonable. In fact it
is conceivable that some actions require more than one decisional step, to be
fully approved.
If a board happens to make a decision -1, it is quite reluctant to change
in the next. This model differs from usual contagion models in that the risk
of infection or adoption of an innovation may be diminished by an internal
dynamics of the board.
We will write M for M∗ in the following for sake of simplicity. We run
several simulations with varying random seeds per set of parameters and we
monitor the following variables:
• The average decision < mk > of the board k. Because mk = ±1 at each
run, the probability p+k that mk = +1 is given by: p
+
k =
1+<mk>
2
• The average decision M of the whole board network over several runs.
We will call P+ the fraction of boards that make decision +1, averaged
over several runs.
3 Results
We present the results of model 1 on different networks of increasing connec-
tivity. First, with consider a square lattice (figure 2) with an odd number of
vertices on the edge, so that there is a node in the center of the lattice. A node
represents a board of n=10 directors, a link represents the existence of some
shared directors between two boards. The fraction of shared directors between
two connected boards is a parameter γ that we can control. For each pair of
connected boards we can impose that they share a larger fraction of directors
by replacing a director of the first board with a director of the second one (pro-
vided that each director sits only on one chair!). It is very important to remark
that increasing the number of shared directors per pair of boards, introduces
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at some point some links between boards that were not connected before. For
instance at the end when each board is sharing all its directors with its four
initial neighbouring boards, in fact all boards must share the same 10 directors
and therefore the graph must be complete. With no interlock, all nodes are
isolated and γ = 0.
The fraction P+ of boards that adopted decision +1 is plotted as a function
of γ in figure 4(circles).
The same procedure has been applied to a star network (figure 3) and to the
network of boards 1 degree of separation away from the CMB’s board (figure
1). Plots of P+ are shown in figure 4(triangles and squares, respectively).
P+ increases linearly with the average fraction γ of directors shared by any
two boards until it saturates for γ around 0.6. The value of γ observed in real
board networks is γ = .1± .02, which corresponds to P+ ≃ 0.6, i.e. 60 per cent
chances to adopt decision +1, compared to 50 per cent chances in absence of
interlock (P+ = 0.5 for γ = 0).
As a first result, within the hypothesis of this model the degree of interlock
observed in the real CMB’s network is low compared to the one required to
a have a large majority of boards adopting a same decision. Results will be
further analysed in the discussion section.
4 Model 2: the influence of lobbies and in-
formation
The second model shares the same general dynamics as the first model in terms
of initial conditions and sequences of updating directors and boards opinion,
but the field variables hi are increased by two terms taking into account mutual
influence of well-connected directors and the propagation of information from
boards which met previously.
The central question about the role of the interlock is how it influences the
decision making dynamics ([2], [5]). In a previous paper ([1]) we proposed a
mechanism that we re-introduce in the present model. We assume that two
directors in the board who also serve in another outside board are likely to
take each other’s opinion into account more seriously than the opinion of di-
rectors with whom they don’t have additional professional relationships. These
directors form a graph called interlock graph of the board, for simplicity called
”lobby” in the following. In the equation for the field felt by directors who
participate in a lobby we introduce a coupling factor. Director i feels a field h0i
defined as follows:
h0i =
1
n
n∑
j=1
(1 + α1Jij)sj (3)
where n is the size of the board, Ji,j is the number of outside boards on which
directors i and j sit together, α1 is a parameter modulating the mutual influ-
ence of directors in the lobby.
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Of course directors take into account their own opinion: by definition J(i, i)
should be the total number of outside boards where director i sits. This is much
larger than the number of outside boards a director can share with another one.
So in order to avoid giving a too big weight to the opinion of a director himself
compared to the opinion of his colleagues, J(i, i) is set as the number of out-
side boards where director i serves with at least one other director of the board.
In summary, a director with several appointments, takes into account his own
opinion more than that of his colleagues. Among his colleagues then, he takes
into account their opinions based on how many professional relationships he
holds with them.
As a consequence of the dynamics, directors belonging to a connected com-
ponent of a lobby tend to have the same opinion. As the lobby is a graph
consisting of one or more connected components, it must be kept in mind that
different connected components may have different opinions and their effects
on the whole board could partly cancel out.
Furthermore, information about what decision other boards have made so
far, can reach a board thanks to the interlocking directors. Therefore, their
influence is twofold: on one hand they have an initial opinion which reflects
the decision made in another board (model 1). They could just support that
same decision, keeping confidential the information about the fact that the
other board has made that decision. On the other hand they can reveal this
information to the other directors, which will take it into account to form their
opinion. We model this by means of a second term in the equation for the field.
This is a sort of external field he acting on all directors of board k, but specific
to the board k. It equals the sum of the decisions made so far in the boards
connected through interlock to the board k, weighted by the number of shared
directors:
he =
deg(k)∑
l=1
JBklbl (4)
The sum is running on the boards interlocked to board k, deg(k) is the connec-
tivity degree of board k, JBkl is the number of directors shared by boards k and
l, bl is the decision made by the board if it has already met, bl = 0 otherwise.
Again we don’t include any factor of prestige for the boards. Nevertheless, a
board is more influential on another if it has more directors on it. It is impor-
tant to stress the fact that boards that have not yet met do not influence the
decision.
The information reaching a board can then be different from the information
about what all other boards, interlocked or not, have decided so far.
The total field acting on director i is:
hi = h
0
i + h
e =
1
n
n∑
j=1
(1 + α1Jij)sj + α2
deg(k)∑
l=1
JBklbl (5)
where α2 is a parameter modulating the influence of the information about
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other board’s decisions.
We are now interested in the behavior of the system in the space of the
parameters α1 and α2.
5 Results
We have run model 2 on two real board networks: the boards that are 1 degree of
separation away from Chase Manhattan Bank’s (CMB) board, and the boards
2 degrees of separation away from CMB’s board. We refer to them in the
following as CMB Net 1 and CMB Net 2, respectively. CMB Net 1 consists of
35 boards, with average size 12, and average fraction of shared directors equals
to 0.1. The average connectivity degree is 5. CMB Net 2 consists of 277 boards,
with average size 12, and average degree 9, average fraction of shared directors
0.1.
We varied parameters α1 and α2 in order to understand what can be the
impact of lobbies and the impact of information on the decision making process
over the board network.
Results of simulations on CMB Net 1 and CMB Net 2 are given in figure
5 and figure 7 respectively.
For CMB Net 1, increasing the influence α1 of common appointments in
external boards from 0 to 1 while keeping α2 = 0 (fig. 5 left), leads to the
increase of P+ from 0.63±0.01 to 0.68±0.01. On the other hand P+ increases
dramatically with the influence α2 of the information about connected boards’
decisions (fig. 5 right). For high values of α2 there is no more dependence on
α1.
When α1 = 0 and α2 = 0, then model 2 is formally equivalent to model
1. We recall that we have run model 1 on a network with the same topology
as CBM Net1, but with an homogeneous fraction γ of shared directors. When
γ equals the average fraction of shared directors observed in CBM Net1, then
model 1 yields P+ = 0.6, close to P+ = 0.63 found with model 2. So the ethero-
geneity of the fraction of shared directors doesn’t seem to play a significant role
on the network as a whole.
Figure 6 shows the map of the probability P+ to make decision +1 over
the topology of the network. Dark nodes make decision +1 with high proba-
bility. Dark edges represent a board interlock consisting of two or more shared
directors, clear edges represent one shared director interlock.
For CMB Net 2, there is no dependence of P+ on α1 even for α2 small. The
dependence of P+ on α2 (fig. 7 , circles) is as dramatic as for CMB Net 1.
Of course the chosen schedule of meetings when information propagates
from the center to the periphery seems important. To test this, we considered
three different cases:
• CMB’s board meets first, then the boards 1 degree of separation away
from CMB’s board meet with a fixed schedule and finally the boards 2
degrees away meet with a fixed schedule.
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• CMBmeets first and then the other boards meet with a schedule randomly
chosen at every run,
• the schedule of all boards, including the first, is randomly chosen at every
run
Results obtained in the three cases are shown in figure 7 (circles, triangles
and stars, respectively). The dramatic effect of information observed for case 1
(circles) is insensitive to the particular schedule chosen, inside layer 1 and inside
layer 2. In case 2 (triangles) the probability of making decision +1 remains
small even when the influence of information is strong. In case 3 (stars) the
probability of making decision +1 is basically not different from the control
value 0.5 occurring when adoption of decision +1 and -1 are equally probable.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
We have presented two models for the decision making process of a network
of interlocked boards about a common topic with a binary choice ±1. The
opinions of directors of the boards are initially evenly distributed, but the most
central board meets first and takes the decision +1 by convention.
• Model 1 only assumes that agents are imitative and that directors with
multiple appointments arrive at a board meeting with an initial opinion
which favors the decision made in the last board meeting they participated
at.
• Model 2 further takes into account the enhanced mutual influence of di-
rectors sharing appointments in outside boards and the decisions made
by interlocked boards.
Results of simulations with model 1 show that the average probability P+
that a board adopts the decision of the center node increases linearly with the
average fraction γ of directors shared by any two boards until it saturates. But
the value of γ observed in real board networks (γ = 0.1) corresponds to only
60 per cent chances to make decision +1, compared to 50 per cent chances
in absence of interlock. Therefore if one assumes that board interlock only
introduces a bias in the initial opinions of interlocking directors, then the effect
of the interlock on the decision making dynamics is very small.
For Model 2, we find that common appointments in external boards (α1 > 0)
affects very weakly the spreading dynamics. By contrast, information about
interlocked boards’ decisions (α2 > 0) has a dramatic impact on the average
probability P+ that a board adopts the decision of the center. If we assume that
external information has an influence comparable to the influence of colleagues’
average opinion (α2 ≃ 0.1), we then find that almost certainly all boards end
up adopting the decision of the center (P+ = .9 for CMB Net 1, P+ = .9 for
CMB Net 2).
The order of boards meeting is of crucial importance: a meeting schedule
respecting the distance of the boards from the central board is a necessary con-
dition to have a large majority of boards making the same decision. In fact,
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innovations in real board networks has been observed [4] to start from a periph-
eral node and almost never from the most central node. But the diffusion takes
place only when the central node adopts the innovation and it is then imitated
by connected boards. In our model the radiation from the center hypothesis
is based on the idea that the topic is discussed in a board when it is proposed
by an interlocked director who has been involved in the same discussion on
another board. Even if in real boards the meetings are not scheduled as we
have assumed in our model, one can argue that directors of central boards usu-
ally know before the meeting what their board is likely to decide and through
interlock this information can be taken into account in the meetings of more
peripheral boards even if they are scheduled before the meeting of the central
boards.
The models presented here are very stylized with respect to the real mech-
anisms involved in a decision making process in a network of boards. Our
hypothesis about agents fall in the framework of the ”herd behavior”. We have
chosen to make the smallest number of hypothesis on the agents in order to
keep the behavior of the system completely comprehensible.
As a general conclusion we find that imitation of colleagues and opinion
bias due to the interlock are not sufficient to trigger an avalanche of identical
decisions over the network, whereas information about interlocked boards’ de-
cisions is. But there is no need to invoke public information about what all
boards have decided, nor any external dramatic events.
This model thus provides a simple endogenous mechanism to explain the
fact that boards of the largest corporations of a country can, in the span of a
few months, take the same decisions about general topics such as investments
and advertisements.
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ALCOA INC
ALLIEDSIGNAL INC
AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORP
AMERITECH CORP
BELL ATLANTIC CORP
BROWNING FERRIS INDUSTRIES INC
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CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL CORP
CHASE MANHATTAN CORP NEW
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CUMMINS ENGINE CO INC
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DUKE ENERGY CORP
ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS CORP
EXXON CORP
FREEPORT MCMORAN COPPER & GOLD
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO
J C PENNEY CO INC
JOHNSON & JOHNSON
LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC
MAY DEPARTMENT STORES CO
MOTOROLA INC
NEW YORK TIMES CO
PFIZER INC
POLO RALPH LAUREN CORP
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP NE
RYDER SYSTEM INC
SPRINT CORP
UNION PACIFIC CORP
UNISYS CORP
UNOCAL CORP
WARNER LAMBERT CO
Figure 1: The network of boards at 1 degree of separation from
Chase Manhattan Bank’s board (CMB net 1).
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Figure 2: Square lattice of 7X7 nodes. A node represents a
board of n=10 directors, a link represents the existence of some
shared directors between two boards. Nodes color corresponds
to the value of the probability P+ of adopting decision +1,
when the fraction γ of shared directors between two connected
boards is 0.4.
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Figure 3: Star network of 115 nodes. The central node has
connectivity degree 16. The nodes in layers 2,3,4 have connec-
tivity degree 4,2,1 respectively. Nodes color corresponds to the
value of the probability P+ of adopting decision +1, when the
fraction γ of shared directors between two connected boards is
0.4.
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Figure 4: Probability of adoption of decision +1 as a function
of the fraction γ of shared directors between two connected
boards. circles: lattice; triangles: star network; squares: the
network CMB net 1 shown in figure 1.
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Figure 5: left: Probability P+ of making decision +1 as a
function of the influence α1 of common appointments in outside
boards. Each curve corresponds to a fixed value of the influence
α2 of the information about connected boards’ decisions. right:
P+ as a function of α2.
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Figure 6: CMB net 1. Color represents the probability P+ to
make decision +1. P+ ranges in [0 1]. P+ is computed from
100 runs. Dark edges represent a board interlock consisting of
two or more shared directors. Clear edges represent one shared
director interlock.
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Figure 7: Probability P+ of adopting decision +1 as a function
of the influence α2 of information about connected boards’ deci-
sions. Results on 100 runs. Three meeting schedules. Circles:
first CMB, then boards at 1 degree of separation from CMB,
then those at 2 degree of separation . Triangles: CMB meets
first, then the other boards meet with a schedule randomly cho-
sen at every run. Stars: the schedule of all boards, including
the first, is randomly chosen at every run.
